Productivity effects of public capital maintenance: Evidence from U.S. states by Kalyvitis, S. & Vella, E.
On the Productivity E¤ects of Public Capital Maintenance:
Evidence from U.S. States
Sarantis Kalyvitis and Eugenia Vellay
June 12, 2014
forthcoming in Economic Inquiry
Abstract
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1 Introduction
The potential role of government expenditure on public infrastructure in boosting economic activity
has received much attention in academic and policy circles.1 In the United States during the
recent Great Recession, public spending on infrastructure projects has been a major component of
the 2009-2019 stimulus package. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act allocates $105.3
billion to infrastructure investment, of which $66.1 billion is directed to transportation and water
infrastructure. Early literature (e.g. Aschauer, 1989; Munnell, 1990a,b) found very large returns
from infrastructure investment, while subsequent studies, pointing out a number of econometric
issues, failed to estimate a signicantly positive impact on output, a nding that has come to
be known as the public capital productivity puzzle(Evans and Karras, 1994; Holtz-Eakin, 1994;
Baltagi and Pinnoi, 1995; Garcia-Milà et al., 1996). Another strand of research has investigated the
extent to which productivity benets extend beyond the narrow connes of each states borders,
for instance, through manufacturer-supplier networks, reduction of travel time and logistics costs
(Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz, 1995; Boarnet, 1998; Boisso et al., 2000; Cohen and Paul, 2004; Pereira
and Andraz, 2004; Sloboda and Yao, 2008).2
Even though the literature on the U.S. public infrastructure-productivity nexus is extensive, it
has not taken into account the operations and maintenance (O&M) spending, which is required for
the repair and safe operation of the existing infrastructure stock. The nation-wide gures provided
by the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2010) report for public spending on transportation and water
infrastructure over the period 1956-2007 show that a little more than half of total spending for such
infrastructure has been used for operation and maintenance.3 State and local governments (SLGs)
account for close to 90% of O&M expenditures, while a signicant share of capital expenditures by
SLGs is nanced by federal grants and loan subsidies (close to 50% before the mid-1980s and about
one-third since then) according to the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2007; 2010). Moreover, since
1See Gramlich (1994), Sturm et al. (1998), and Romp and de Haan (2007) for literature surveys.
2Hulten and Schwab (1997, p.157) o¤er some typical examples: ...an interstate highway in Illinois does o¤er
some benets to the residents of other states, a sewage treatment plant in Maryland that reduces water pollution in
the Chesapeake Bay benets people in a wide region. Note that the possibility of public capital having negative
spillovers because economic activity may be drawn to the zone with the infrastructure investment and away from
otherwise equivalent areas has also been theorized in the literature (see Boarnet, 1998).
3Transportation and water infrastructure has typically been the focus of the public capital productivity literature
following Munnell (1990b), with the main components analyzed including highways and streets, water and sewer
facilities, and other buildings and structures.
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the late 1970s real infrastructure spending by SLGs has been growing at a faster annual rate than
the corresponding federal outlays and has accounted for about 75% of total public sector spending
on infrastructure. These stylized facts provide strong motivation for an empirical assessment of the
productivity impact of O&M outlays by SLGs in addition to the widely-explored, traditional e¤ect
of capital spending.
The aim of the present study is to empirically explore the direct and spillover e¤ects of O&M
spending on total factor productivity (TFP) growth among the 48 contiguous U.S. states. We use a
new state-level dataset for capital and O&M spending on water and transportation infrastructure,
which we have assembled for the period 1978-2000 based on the Census Bureaus SLG Finances
series. The budgetary nature of the dataset stands in contrast to the approach typically followed in
the literature, which has mainly used (often controversial) estimates of public capital stocks, and
allows us to pursue a topic left unexplored in previous studies, namely an assessment of the produc-
tivity impacts of O&M outlays and a comparison of them with the corresponding ones for capital
spending. Our econometric analysis employs a semiparametric varying-coe¢ cient specication,
which o¤ers observation-specic estimates of output elasticities, in line with recent developments
in the literature that have emphasized the importance of parameter heterogeneity and nonlinearities
in the growth process (see e.g. Masanjah and Papageorgiou, 2004; Henderson et al., 2012).
Our empirical ndings indicate, rst, that interstate spillovers are signicantly positive and
exceed within-state impacts for O&M (and capital) spending, implying that there is a substantial
wedge between the aggregate and own-state rates of return. Second, the spillover e¤ect of O&M
spending is found to be much higher (up to eight times on average) than the corresponding impact
of capital spending. These results remain highly robust when we take an alternative approach
via local GMM estimation to address concerns about potential endogeneity. We further robustify
inference through a battery of sensitivity tests, including an alternative measurement of the spillover
variables.
Our paper is close in spirit to Henderson and Kumbhakar (2006), who attributed the pub-
lic capital productivity puzzle to neglected nonlinearities in the production process and recovered
statistically signicant returns to public capital via a nonparametric approach, yet without consid-
ering the potential spillover e¤ects of public spending.4 Notably, there is only scant evidence on the
4Earlier results by Fernald (1999) also underscored the existence of nonlinearities in the production function. In a
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productive impact of public spending on capital maintenance. Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis (2005)
have used nation-wide data from the Canadian Capital and Repair Expendituressurvey and have
found that Canada would benet from a fall in total expenditures on both public capital and main-
tenance and that the aggregate share of maintenance in total expenditures should be lower. Other
studies examining the role of O&M spending (e.g. Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997; Ghosh and Gregoriou,
2008) have conrmed that capital maintenance is an important determinant of growth, but have
used only proxies due to the lack of reliable and consistent data. More recently, Kalyvitis and Vella
(2011) have estimated, using national-level data from the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2007), a
negative e¤ect of federal infrastructure outlays on infrastructure and a positive one of state and
local outlays (particularly O&M).5 In none of these studies are the spillover e¤ects of public capital
maintenance taken into account. The present paper complements and extends this literature by
o¤ering a state-level analysis of the productive impacts of public capital maintenance, which high-
lights the interregional productivity spillovers of O&M outlays among U.S. states, in comparison
to the standard capital outlays employed in related studies.
Our nding that the interregional spillover e¤ects of infrastructure expenditures can be higher
than the direct ones may not seem so surprising given that the nancing cost and the associated
distortive consequences of taxation are borne by other states in this case.6 But how can one
explain the di¤erences in the magnitudes of the spillover e¤ects between capital and O&M outlays?
A possible explanation may be related to the lack of central intervention by the federal government
in the case of O&M spending, since O&M is almost exclusively locally nanced, while federal
grants account for a signicant share of state and local capital spending on infrastructure. The
main conclusion thus is that the failure to internalize the spillovers associated with O&M spending
through central intervention may suggest an underprovision of it in the U.S. states during the period
similar vein, Aschauer (1999) found that, whereas linear estimates of production functions deliver an infrastructure
e¤ect that disappears when state e¤ects are introduced, allowing for nonlinearity delivers robust e¤ects. In addition,
Duggal et al. (1999) specied a technological growth rate as a nonlinear function of infrastructure and demonstrated
that the impact of infrastructure on the U.S. economy is not constant. More recently, Égert et al. (2009) have used
threshold models in a Bayesian-averaging framework and nd that the growth impact of infrastructure investment
is highly nonlinear, varying across OECD countries and over time. Similarly, Colletaz and Hurlin (2008) nd strong
threshold e¤ects in the relationship between output and public capital using a Panel-Smooth-Threshold model.
5Earlier evidence on the productivity impact of public capital maintenance in the U.S. comes mainly from case
studies or cost-benet analyses concentrated on highways. An exception is Pinnoi (1994), who provided production
function estimates suggesting that state and local expenditures on highway maintenance are productive with respect
to the private and non-agricultural non-manufacturing sectors. See Section 4 for more details on studies with data
for highways.
6See also Carlino and Inman (2013) for similar interregional e¤ects of ARRA actions on U.S. employment.
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under investigation, since SLGs might be too small to think big enough, creating a collective action
problem. Given the central importance of infrastructure spending in scal stimulus packages and
the discussion on the potential e¢ cacy, need for, and impact of a National Infrastructure Bank,
these results seem to have timely policy implications.
The results presented here corroborate recent evidence on the importance of spillover e¤ects
on growth and trade from scal policies (see e.g. Beetsma and Giuliodori, 2011; Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko, 2013; Hebous and Zimmerman, 2013). The empirical ndings from these studies
suggest that, apart from the traditional domestic multiplier e¤ect, scal policy generates non-
negligible secondary e¤ects on growth across countries as well. Our evidence on the impacts of
public infrastructure spending across U.S. states further highlights the potential interdependence
of macroeconomic policies and emphasizes the need to assess these linkages in order to design
better-targeted measures for enhancing national productivity.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the methodology, Section 3
describes the data and Section 4 presents the estimation results along with a variety of robustness
checks. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Methodology
In this section we sketch out the main elements of our empirical analysis, namely some theoretical
base with respect to the productive impact of public O&M spending, our empirical specication,
and the estimation approaches taken.
2.1 Theoretical foundations for the productive impact of public O&M spending
While the rationale regarding the capital component is straightforward, since capital expenditure
directly adds new capacity to the existing infrastructure network, the channel through which O&M
expenditures can contribute to private production deserves some comment. Public O&M spending
serves two purposes: rst, it counters depreciation (see e.g. Rioja, 2003; Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis,
2004; Dioikitopoulos and Kalyvitis, 2008; Agénor, 2009); second, it a¤ects the service ow of the
existing stock and in a production function should be multiplied by the service ow of the existing
stock to get an e¤ective service ow (in the same way that electricity expenditures can be entered
4
multiplicatively with capital to proxy for utilization).
In what follows, we relate both types of infrastructure expenditure to productivity rather than
just the infrastructure capital stock as is usually done in the literature. This approach is taken
here for two reasons. First, conventional estimates of infrastructure stocks are based on constant
depreciation schemes, i.e. unrelated to maintenance spending, and neglect the strand of literature
mentioned above. Second, our main purpose is to disentangle the productive impacts of the two
types of infrastructure outlays on a comparative basis, which would not be possible using measures
of public capital stocks instead of ows. Our empirical setup therefore relies on Barro (1990)-
style models with government spending as an input to the production process. Devarajan et al.
(1996) further specied two types of government spending - one more productive than the other
- as production inputs and, in a similar spirit, Pinnoi (1994) in his empirical study separated the
e¤ect of services from highways and streets in the production function into capital and maintenance
outlays. More recently, Hashimzade and Myles (2010) have developed a multi-country extension
of the Barro model of productive public expenditure to account for the presence of infrastructural
externalities between countries in the production function.
2.2 The empirical model
We work in a standard growth-accounting framework by assuming a general production function
with the following inputs: capital, K, labor, L, own-state capital and O&M spending, G and M ,
and capital and O&M spending by other states, SG and SM :
Y = F (K; L; G; M; SG; SM ; t) (1)
where t is a time trend generally interpreted in this literature as an exogenous technology index
and SG and SM form transboundary spillover indices.7
More specically, we assume that states N = f1; 2; :::; ng belong to a network. Let ij be a
relationship between two states i and j. The interpretation of such links may be attributed, for
7Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995) and Sloboda and Yao (2008) include spillover variables in production functions,
while Cohen and Paul (2004) include a similar spillover index of highway stocks as an input to a cost function.
In a di¤erent context, the literature that views innovation e¤orts as a major source of technological progress has
extensively studied the e¤ects of international R&D spillovers on productivity growth (see e.g. the seminal paper by
Coe and Helpman, 1995).
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instance, to trade between them. It is assumed rst that ij > 0 if there is a link from node j to
node i and ij = 0 otherwise, second, that ij 6= ij , and third, that ii = 0 (directed and weighted
network). This notation allows us to represent the network with an adjacency matrix, , of which
the ij  th entry is ij and the main diagonal contains zeros.8 The two spatial externality variables
are then dened by a summary statistic of the capital and O&M spending of a states neighbors in
the network, i.e. the aggregate measures of the outlays by all neighboring states linked to region i:
SGit 
NP
j=1
ij
Yit
Yjt
Gjt (2)
SMit 
NP
j=1
ij
Yit
Yjt
Mjt (3)
The presence of the output multiplicative factor in (2)-(3) is justied by the fact that a state j with
a high level of economic activity, presumably constitutes overly large portions of the spillovers, SGit
and SMit, for a small state i. Thus, by multiplying region js spending by the ratio of state is
output to its own output, which is a relatively small number, the size e¤ects in the measures of SG
and SM are neutralized (see Cohen and Paul, 2004).
Di¤erentiating (1) with respect to time, dividing by Y , and rearranging terms yields:
_Y
Y
  K
_K
K
  L
_L
L
=
_A
A
+ G
_G
G
+ M
_M
M
+ SG
_SG
SG
+ SM
_SM
SM
(4)
where the 0s correspond to output elasticities and _AA is the exogenous rate of technological progress.
Next, we dene a Törnqvist index of TFP growth, based on the private factors, K and L, to
discretely approximate the left-hand side of (1). According to the denition of this index, the
growth rates are equal to the di¤erence in the natural logarithms of successive observations of the
components and the weights are equal to the mean of the factor shares of the components in the
corresponding pair of years:
gTFPit   lnYit  
_
sY Kit lnKit  
_
sY Lit lnLit (5)
8 If the network is undirected, then the matrix  is symmetric (ij = ij). If the network is unweighted, then
ij = 1 if there is a link between nodes i and j. As described in the next section, we proxy ij with data on
commodity ows across states to account for di¤erent degrees of interstate dependence.
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where
_
sY Qit  0:5
 
sY Qit + sY Qit 1

for Q = K;L and i = 1; :::; N denotes the state and t = 1; :::; T
denotes the year, given that the output elasticities of capital and labor equal the observed income
shares, sY K and sY L, in a perfectly competitive environment.
In order to account for the potential impact of the relative size of the two spending compo-
nents, in the right-hand side of (1) we model the unobserved contributions of capital and O&M
expenditures as unknown functions of the O&M share in total own-state spending (O&M share
henceforth), i.e. G (Z) ; M (Z) ; SG (Z) ; SM (Z), where Z  MG+M . Given that capital and O&M
outlays are imperfect substitutes, the O&M share is expected to have a nonlinear relationship
with growth (see Figure 1 in Kalaitzidakis and Kalyvitis, 2005), and is therefore treated here as a
source of potential parameter heterogeneity. This approach will also allow us to evalute how the
output elasticities of infrastructure outlays change when the composition between capital and O&M
expenditures is altered and which range of the existing O&M sharesamong states is associated
with the highest elasticities.
Combining all the above, yields our estimated equation:
gTFPit = 0 +
N 1X
i=1
iDi + bt| {z }
linear part
+ G (Zit)  lnGit + M (Zit)  lnMit
+SG (Zit)  lnSGit + SM (Zit)  lnSMit + uit (6)
where the exogenous rate of technological progress is modelled as a function of state-specic dummy
variables, Di, and a time trend, capturing respectively idiosyncratic and time-related exogenous
shifts in technology. Equation (6) allows the growth of both own-state and other statesspending on
infrastructure capital and O&M to inuence TFP growth nonlinearly by introducing heterogeneity
in the marginal e¤ects.9
9Notice that dening TFP based on the private factors (the well-known Solow residual) and relating it to govern-
ment services, which dates back to Aschauer (1989) and Hulten and Schwab (1991), allows us here to obtain a more
parsimonious - in terms of number of parameters - specication than in the case of the corresponding production
function. Note also that in our model we include government capital and O&M spending as additional production
inputs, which implies that gTFP represents a biased index of technological change that will be a¤ected by changes
in the growth rates of G, M , SG, SM . Cost-function specications have also been used in the literature, but in a
limited number of studies, since historical price data is typically available only for manufacturing rms.
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2.3 Estimation approach
The estimation approach we follow is based on the semiparametric smooth-coe¢ cient model (SSCM
henceforth) proposed by Li et al. (2002) as a exible specication for studying a general regression
relationship with varying coe¢ cients (see e.g. Fan and Zhang, 1999; Cai et al., 2000a,b). The SSCM
lets the marginal e¤ect of the variable(s) of interest be an unknown function of an observable
covariate and hence introduces parameter heterogeneity. This specication traces nonlinearities
in the estimated relationships, o¤ering the advantage of more exibility in functional form than
parametric counterparts, as the coe¢ cient functions are unspecied. Furthermore, by allowing
coe¢ cients to depend on other variables it does not su¤er from the curse of dimensionalityproblem
to the extent of a purely nonparametric specication, which also typically requires larger sample
sizes. Li et al. (2002) illustrated the application of the SSCM by estimating the production function
of the nonmetal-mineral-manufacturing industry in China. More recent applications include e.g.
Chou et al. (2004), Stengos and Zacharias (2006), and Jansen et al. (2008).
Due to the presence of the linear part, (6) forms a partially linear varying-coe¢ cient specica-
tion, in which the growth of both own-state and other statesspending on infrastructure capital
and O&M is allowed to inuence TFP growth nonlinearly by introducing heterogeneity in the mar-
ginal e¤ects. We employ a standard kernel density estimator with Gaussian kernel and choose the
bandwidth using cross validation. The three-step process we follow is described in detail in the
Appendix (see also Chou et al., 2004).
One issue of concern that may arise when estimating (6) is related to the presence of the spillover
variables. Specically, if each state government knows that the expenditures of other states can
matter for their own productivity, then one might expect that these productivity spillovers can
induce strategic interactions (budget spillovers) among localities (see e.g. Case et al., 1993; Baicker,
2005), which would lead to endogeneity problems in the estimation. To overcome this hazard,
we also augment the analysis with a local generalized method of moments (LGMM) estimation,
proposed in a dynamic panel data context by Tran and Tsionas (2010). LGMM can be considered as
an extension to the Li et al. (2002) model by allowing for some or all the regressors to be correlated
with the error term and for the possibility that the latter is serially correlated.10 Following the
10By including the lagged dependent variable as a regressor, this specication also accounts for the dynamic nature
of TFP growth. Note that we have investigated the possibility of serial correlation in our baseline estimation, but
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literature discussing the choice of optimal instruments in the context of semiparametric panel
data models (see Baltagi and Li, 2002; Tran and Tsionas, 2010), we use density-weighted kernel
estimates of f E(gTFPit 1 j Zit 1); E(gTFPit 2 j Zit 2); E( lnGit j Zit); E lnGit 1 j Zit 1);
E( lnMit j Zit); E( lnMit 1 j Zit 1); ( lnSGit j Zit); E( lnSGit 1 j Zit 1); E( lnSMit j Zit);
E( lnSMit 1 j Zit 1)g as instruments for fgTFPit 1 ;  lnGit;  lnMit;  lnSGit ;  lnSMitg, given
that the O&M share, Zit, should mainly be related to factors such as the age of the infrastructure
stock, demographic trends, weather conditions, natural events, and geography, which are viewed as
exogenous. Furthermore, to mitigate the e¤ects of possible cross-sectional dependence we transform
all the individual series of the data into of deviations from their cross-section means at each point
in time t, which is a standard procedure for samples with a relatively small time dimension.11
3 Data
Our sample covers the 48 contiguous U.S. states over the period 1978-2000, with a total of 1104
observations.12 A brief description of the data (measured in millions of 2000 U.S. dollars) follows;
further details about the data sources and the method of construction of all the variables used in
the estimations are provided in the Data Appendix.
We obtain data on SLG expenditures from the Rex-Dacdatabase, which is an internal le of
the U.S. Census Bureau. This database is an archive of nearly all the data collected in the peri-
odic censuses of governments and annual surveys of government nances since 1977 (plus 1972).13
Following the classication in the Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2010) report, for O&M and capital
expenditures on water and transportation infrastructure, M and G, we consider data on current
operationsand capital outlayrespectively, for the following ve infrastructure types: aviation,
highways and roads, mass transit, water supply and wastewater treatment, and water transporta-
tion, which also cover the core sectors of public infrastructure routinely used in the related lit-
the corresponding coe¢ cient did not turn out to be statistically signicant.
11Spatial econometrics (see e.g. Anselin, 1988) have been widely employed in the literature to deal with spatial
interactions. However, given the complexity of nonparametric estimation methods, spatial approaches have been used
in this framework to a very limited extent so far.
12 In line with the literature, Alaska, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia are excluded from the sample.
13The database of 1,300 nance items is spread across eight data tables. Data become available annually from
1977 onwards, while there are no state-level statistics available for local governments (i.e. counties, municipalities,
townships, special districts and school districts) for 2001 and 2003, because the corresponding surveys were redesigned
to provide only national estimates. This restricts our sample to the period 1978-2000.
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erature. Current operationscomprises direct expenditure for remuneration of o¢ cers/employees
and for supplies, materials, and contractual services except for capital outlay. It also includes re-
pair and maintenance services to maintain required standards of compliance for the intended use.
Capital outlays, on the other hand, are costs associated with: (i) construction, i.e. production,
additions, replacements, or major structural alterations to xed works (ii) purchase of land, existing
structures, and equipment. Capital expenditures include purchases of new assets as well as major
improvements/alterations to existing assets.14
Spillover variables for each state, SG and SM , are constructed as weighted sums of capital and
O&M infrastructure spending in other states given by (2) and (3). Following Cohen and Paul
(2004), di¤erent states are weighted, rst, by commodity ows across states to reect di¤erent
degrees of interstate dependence and, second, by information on the relative sizes of state-level
economic activity. This weighting scheme is justied by the fact that a state with a high level
of economic activity, such as New York, presumably constitutes large portions of SG and SM for
a relatively small state, such as Rhode Island. Thus, by multiplying New Yorks infrastructure
spending by the ratio of Rhode Islands gross state product to its own gross state product, which
is a relatively small number, the size e¤ects in the construction of SG and SM for Rhode Island are
neutralized. The weight that each state j has on state i in SG and SM is proxied by the share of the
value of goods shipped from state i to state j, ij , in the total value of goods shipped from state
i to all other states,
P
i 6=j
ij , i.e. ij  ij=
P
i 6=j
ij . The above weighting strategy aims to capture
the di¤erent degrees of economic ties and geographic connections between states by avoiding the
oversimplifying assumption that each dollar spent by other states has equal interregional spillover
e¤ects on any targeted state.15 In subsection 4.2 we test the sensitivity of our results to these
weights by employing an alternative computation of the spillover variables, which maintains only
14For a detailed description of what exactly constitutes the two main spending categories, see U.S. Census Bureau,
Government Finance and Employment Classication Manual, Table 5.1: Description of Character and Object Cate-
gories(source: http://www2.census.gov/govs/pubs/classication/2006_classication_manual.pdf). For a denition
of each type of infrastructure, see Appendix B of Congressional Budget O¢ ce (2010).
15Preliminary estimations were performed simply using equal weights in the construction of SG and SM . The
output elasticities of own-spending were found to be positive, but small (amounting on average to 0.010 and 0.006 for
G andM , respectively), while the output elasticities of spending by other states were found to be negative (amounting
on average to -0.011 and -0.082 for SG and SM ). However, we believe these initial estimates, which di¤er substantially
from the results reported below, can be very misleading as they fail to account for the di¤erent degrees of economic
and geographic interrelations between states. Because no corresponding time series is available for the commodity
ows data, we use an average of the data for 1993 and 1997, which also eliminates potential endogeneity concerns
(see Cohen and Paul, 2004).
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the information on the relative economic activity in the weighting procedure. Further, we show
that our results hold for a sample of highway data since this weighting scheme was rst applied in
the case of highways (see Cohen and Paul, 2004).
Finally, to construct the state-by-year TFP index we use data on output, capital and labor for
the private non-farm sector. Output, Y; is dened as the real GDP, and labor, L; is dened as the
total number of workers. Estimates of state-level capital stocks, K, are from Garofalo and Yamarik
(2002).
Table A1 presents the data averages by state for the TFP-growth index (our dependent variable)
and for the regressors used in the estimations. On average, TFP increased over the 1978-2000 period
in all states. Connecticut and Massachusetts experienced the largest productivity growth rates of
about 1.8% and 1.7% respectively, while, at the opposite end of the scale, the productivity-growth
rate for Montana was close to zero. Between 1978 and 2000 capital spending grew positively in
most states at a mean rate of 1.8%. For nine states (IL, LA, ME, MD, MT, NH, ND, VT, and WV)
the average growth rates of capital expenditures were negative. In contrast, O&M spending grew
positively in all the states at a mean rate of around 2.9%. Table A1 also reports the average level
of the O&M share, which shows considerable variability across states, ranging from 35% (WY)
to 65% (MI), and exhibits the highest standard deviation (6.25%) of all the variables used in our
baseline specication.
4 Estimation results
In this section, we present our empirical ndings for the semiparametric model outlined in Section 2
by focusing on the output elasticities estimated with respect to own-state capital and O&M outlays,
as well as capital and O&M outlays by other states, G () ; M () ; SG () ; SM (), respectively. We
also perform a variety of checks to address potential concerns about the robustness of our results.
4.1 Main ndings
As a benchmark, we initially estimate the model treating the s as constants, i.e. by assuming
that the estimated relationships are linear. The rst column of Table 1 gives the results from a
specication that does not account for spillover e¤ects. As can be readily seen, we obtain statisti-
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cally insignicant estimates for the output elasticities of both capital and O&M outlays on public
infrastructure. This result is in line with the existing literature on the public capital produc-
tivity puzzle in the U.S., which has stated that once either state or both state and time e¤ects
are controlled for, the resulting estimates of the marginal productivity of public capital are not
signicantly di¤erent from zero (see, among others, Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Baltagi and Pinnoi, 1995;
Garcia-Milà et al., 1996). In the second column of Table 1, we run a similar linear regression but
accounting for spillover e¤ects. We again obtain insignicant estimates for both intrastate e¤ects,
whereas the coe¢ cients for the corresponding cross-state spillover e¤ects turn out to be positive
and statistically signicant.
Given that neglected nonlinearities can be important in assessing the productive impact of
public infrastructure (e.g. Henderson and Kumbhakar, 2006), we next proceed to semiparametric
estimation of (6). The estimated coe¢ cients are observation-specic, meaning that output elastic-
ities with respect to capital and O&M spending are derived for each state and time period. We
depict the semiparametric smooth coe¢ cients along with the upper and lower limit of the 95%
bootstrap condence interval in Figure 1. For comparison purposes, we also plot the estimated pa-
rameters from the parametric linear specication (depicted by the dashed lines). The e¤ects from
the semiparametric regression are estimated conditional upon the O&M share and the graphs
clearly suggest that the functions are non-constant in the range of the state variable, exhibiting
non-linear patterns.16
In detail, the upper diagrams in Figure 1 plot pointwise estimates of the output elasticities
with respect to states own capital and O&M outlays, G(Zit) and M (Zit) respectively. Both
graphs indicate that the estimated elasticities are positive for a range of medium-to-high (exceeding
50%) levels of the O&M shareand are maximized when the O&M share is around 55%-60%.
The general picture seems to point towards the existence of output elasticity hillsfor intrastate
infrastructure outlays, in line with the nonlinearities and the growth hillsfor US state expenditures
found by Bania et al. (2007) based on Barro-style models. The lower diagrams of Figure 1 similarly
plot output elasticities with respect to capital and O&M outlays by other states, SG(Zit) and
16We have also estimated the model parametrically by specifying the varying coe¢ cients as a second-degree poly-
nomial of Zit (based on the graphs). The coe¢ cients on the quadratic terms turned out to be statistically signicant
for G, SG and SM , with t -statistics -1.89, 2.50 and 2.30, respectively, which indicates that the use of the SSCM is
justied.
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SM (Zit) respectively, and show that both cross-state spillover e¤ects are positive for all sample
points. In addition, the plotted results indicate that SG(Zit) and SM (Zit) initially decline and
then start to increase above a certain level of the O&M share, with these convex relationships
implying that for low and high levels of the O&M share the productivity spillover e¤ects are
relatively higher. Overall, the graphical analysis suggests that for medium levels of the O&M
sharewithin-state e¤ects appear positive and cross-state spillover impacts take their lowest values,
while for lower/higher levels of the O&M sharewithin-state e¤ects are negative and spillover
e¤ects take their highest values. This evidence seems to imply substitutability between own-state
infrastructure outlays and other statesoutlays.
To examine the e¤ects by state, we calculate the average output elasticities for each state, along
with the corresponding standard errors. The results are reported in Table 2, in which states are
grouped into broad census regions to allow for a comparative regional analysis. The state-specic
estimates indicate that the elasticities of own-state O&M spending lie between -0.027 (NE) and
0.0004 (NY), whereas the corresponding elasticities of capital spending range between -0.022 (WY)
and 0.0034 (IN). Figure 2 o¤ers the corresponding geographical representation. Darker colors on
the maps represent larger values for the estimated elasticities. Higher intrastate e¤ects of public
infrastructure spending are found mostly in the states located in the Midwest and Northeast (e.g. IN,
OH, NY). This is in line with the nding in the public infrastructure literature that productivity
e¤ects are larger in the snowbelt states (see e.g. Hulten and Schwab, 1991; Aschauer, 2001).
On the other hand, interstate spillover e¤ects are more pronounced in the sunbelt states and,
in particular, in the West and South (e.g. CA, GA, NM, TX), which generally consist of more
agricultural and sparsely populated regions.
The general picture is summarized by the means of the observation-specic elasticities, which
are statistical signicant and amount to -0.017 and -0.002 for O&M and capital expenditures,
respectively, implying that, ceteris paribus, a 1% increase in O&M (capital) spending corresponds,
on average, to a 0.017% (0.002%) fall in output.17 In contrast, the output elasticities of other
statesexpenditures are much greater in magnitude, ranging from 0.37 (MO) to 0.46 (MI) for O&M
17Negative estimates for the productivity e¤ect of public capital have been previously reported in the literature (see
e.g. Evans and Karras, 1994; Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz, 1995). In addition, Pinnoi (1994) has estimated negative
output elasticities with respect to highway capital outlay and maintenance for some sectors of economic activity and
U.S. regions. Positive, but small, mean e¤ects (0.006 and 0.009 for capital and O&M, respectively) were estimated
without including the spillover variables. The detailed results by state are presented in the Appendix.
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spending, and are always statistically signicant. The corresponding e¤ects of capital spending are
also positive and statistically signicant, but are much lower in magnitude ranging, from 0.033
(OH) to 0.095 (WY). Our estimates imply that a 1% increase in O&M (capital) spending by other
states corresponds, on average, to a 0.39% (0.046%) increase in output.
Furthermore, in Table 3 we present the results from a LGMM estimation with cross-sectionally
demeaned data, which accounts for the possibility of strategic interactions among local governments
that would lead to endogeneity problems in our regression. We nd that the estimated magnitudes
are very close to our baseline estimation: intrastate e¤ects turn out to be small (-0.0008 and 0.0095
for capital and O&M, on average), while spillover e¤ects are much larger (0.087 and 0.337 for capital
and O&M, respectively). Since the two approaches yield very similar results, we feel condent that
our baseline specication does not su¤er from endogeneity bias and so in the rest of the empirical
analysis we will focus on the baseline approach.
In sum, two broad conclusions can be drawn from the empirical ndings presented in this section.
First, productivity spillovers of O&M (and capital) outlays by other states are signicantly positive
and exceed the corresponding impacts of within-state outlays. Second, the spillover e¤ect of O&M
spending, for which no previous comparable estimates exist in the literature, is found to be much
higher (on average up to eight times) than the corresponding spillover impact of capital spending.
Our results for the low (and in some cases negative) intrastate e¤ects of infrastructure expen-
ditures may naturally raise the question of why state governments commit to these expenditures,
which is not new, though, in the public capital productivity puzzleliterature. From a scal fed-
eralism perspective, a possible explanation might be that a large proportion of this expenditure on
infrastructure is nanced by the federal government through matching grants and loan subsidies to
states and localities. As mentioned in the Introduction, the nation-wide data available show that
this share ranged between 30% and 50% over the period considered.
Furthermore, the negative (and relatively small) estimates for the direct e¤ects of a states own
O&M expenditures on state-level productivity should be taken with caution, as has already been
pointed out in the literature. As Carlino and Inman (2013) state, locally nanced outlays by lower
tier governments are often viewed as ine¤ective for enhancing local productivity, as any benets
accrue to all the states in the union, while tax costs remain the responsibility of the decit-creating
jurisdiction. Evans and Karras (1994), who have also estimated a negative impact of government
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capital on state-level productivity, argue that Even if government activities cost more than they
contribute to state-level private output, they may still be underprovided because government activ-
ities may also contribute direct nonmarket consumption services.18 In our context, public capital
maintenance may be under-provided because government infrastructure expenditures contribute
also to other statesprivate output, as indicated by the large spillover e¤ects.
But how can one explain the particularly high estimates for the impact of the O&M spillover?
A key factor might be associated with the fact that O&M is almost exclusively locally nanced. As
a result, a given state can enjoy the productivity gains from the better maintained infrastructure
network in neighboring states without participating in the cost, which is not the case for capital
spending co-nanced through federal grants from local contributions. Hashimzade and Myles (2010)
show theoretically that in the presence of positive infrastructure externalities among economies the
provision of infrastructure will be ine¢ ciently low unless there is intervention by a supranational
body to coordinate the policies of the individual governments by internalizing the externality. In our
context, the lack of intervention by the central government to share the cost of local maintenance
policies may therefore suggest the possibility of under-provision.
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
To assess the robustness of our main ndings, we perform a battery of sensitivity tests. First, we
attempt to control for the inuence of other variables that may a¤ect state productivity growth
(see Reed, 2009) to ensure that our results do not su¤er from omitted-variables bias. We therefore
include in the linear part of (6) the state unemployment rate to account for cyclical e¤ects, as
well as the following public-sector variables: federal employees(dened as the log of the number
of federal employees per capita), S&L employees(dened as the log of the number of state and
local employees per capita), federal revenue(dened as the intergovernmental revenue received
by SLGs from the federal government as a share of personal income) and tax burden (dened
as total state and local tax revenues as a share of personal income). Additionally, we control for
various characteristics of the population with the following variables: working population(dened
as the percentage of the population between 20 and 64 years of age), non-white(dened as the
18 In Blinders (1991) words: If my car and my back absorb fewer shocks from potholes, I am surely better-o¤; but
GNP may even decline as a result of fewer car repairs and doctors bills.
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percentage of the population that is non-white) and female (dened as the percentage of the
population that is female). The estimation results, reported in column (2) of Table 4, show no
signicant change in the average coe¢ cients. Moreover, the coe¢ cients on the additional controls
generally have the expected signs, with those on working population, federal employees, S&L
employees, and federal revenuebeing statistically signicant.19
Another robustness check is then to use a more general coe¢ cient function that includes a
second state variable, namely the share of other statesO&M spending in the sum of the two
spillover indices, SMSG+SM . The average coe¢ cients presented in column (3) of Table 4, remain
practically unchanged.
Further, we drop the commodity ow weights in the computation of the spillover variables and
keep only the information on relative economic activity to investigate whether our results are driven
by the use of these weights. The estimation results, reported in column (4), demonstrate that the
estimates obtained are again not substantially di¤erent from our baseline ndings (reported in
column (1)).
Finally, we run the regression for a subsample consisting of highway-spending data. We focus
on highways and roads for two reasons. First, they form the largest component of transportation
infrastructure, which is believed to make the economy more e¢ cient by reducing the amount of
time and energy necessary to cover distances between rms, consumers, and employees. Given their
network characteristics, they have so far dominated the literature investigating the spillover e¤ects
question in the context of public infrastructure (e.g. Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz, 1995; Boarnet; 1998;
Cohen and Paul, 2004). More recently, in the context of the literature on government spending
multipliers, Leduc and Wilson (2013) nd that shocks to federal highway funding positively a¤ect
local GDP and calculate average multipliers, which are close to 2, over ten-year horizons. Second,
some cost-benet studies have emphasized the productive impacts of maintenance expenditures on
highways, yet without taking into account their spillover e¤ects.20 To assess the signicance of our
19A correlation matrix of the additional controls is available upon request. Data are obtained from the Census
Bureaus Rex-Dacdatabase for all public-sector variables, from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Local Area Unem-
ployment Statistics for the state-level unemployment rate, and from Pjesky (2006) for the population characteristics,
available until 1999. We have also experimented with other control variables, like the size of the population and the
degree of expenditure decentralization, but they turned out to be statistically insignicant. Finally, using the shares
of total earnings earned in federal, state and local governments instead of the number of federal, state and local
employees produced essentially the same results.
20For instance, Congressional Budget O¢ ce (1988) has indicated that the return to projects designed to maintain
the average condition of the federal highway system could be as high as 30%-40%. In a similar vein, there has
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results for O&M spending on highways, we report in column (5) of Table 4 the estimates obtained
by running the regression for highways and streets. Our main ndings continue to hold, with the
output elasticity of O&M spending by other states being somewhat lower but still considerably
higher than the corresponding e¤ect of capital spending.
5 Concluding remarks
Based on a novel set of data for the 48 contiguous U.S. states over the period 1978-2000, this
paper has aimed to disentangle the productivity impacts of capital and O&M spending on public
infrastructure by explicitly accounting for cross-state spillover e¤ects. To this end, we have used a
semiparametric smooth-coe¢ cient approach to account for potential nonlinearities and parameter
heterogeneity. Our ndings have documented that interstate spillover impacts are signicantly
positive and exceed direct impacts for both types of spending. Importantly, the cross-state spillover
e¤ect of O&M outlays was estimated to be considerably high. These results were found to be robust
to a battery of sensitivity tests, including for the endogeneity of public spending.
Our ndings yield policy conclusions that are relevant for the debate over state and local
infrastructure spending. In particular, they highlight the lack of intervention by the federal gov-
ernment in the case of O&M spending as a potential key factor associated with under-provision for
it in the presence of infrastructural externalities among states. In this vein, the increased need for
federal aid to states for maintenance expenditures, which has largely been ignored until now, is a
key message to policy makers that naturally arises in this context. Another notable implication
is that, given the sub-optimal provision for infrastructure at the state level and the constraints
on public resources, state governments should turn to alternative sources of funding to meet the
nancing gap. To this end, the concept of public-private partnerships, which are joint ventures be-
tween a government entity and the private sector, can be a convenient way to increase the provision
of public services at the local level. These partnerships can enhance public infrastructure through
joint ownership with domestic or international rms and, at the same time, provide opportunities
for local rms through sub-contracting, with emphasis placed on maintenance activities. Also,
been some evidence, based on data from the Federal Highway Administration, suggesting that beyond a certain
point maintenance and management of existing infrastructure become more attractive than investment in additional
capacity; for instance, road-resurfacing projects have cost-benet ratios that are nearly double compared with projects
that add new lanes (Congressional Budget O¢ ce, 1998).
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given that spillovers accrue to neighboring states with relatively higher economic activity, local au-
thorities could explore the possibility of joint initiatives across states at the regional level. In this
context, scal coordination among neighboring states, nanced on the basis of expected benets
through the spillovers assessed, can increase public capital expenditure and aggregate productivity.
By answering some empirical questions unresolved up to now, this study has opened the door
to new research issues. For instance, the paper has not investigated politico-economic factors that
shape infrastructure policy (see e.g. Kemmerling and Stephan, 2002; Cadot et al., 2006). Further
work in this area could therefore look into political factors as determinants of state and local
infrastructure spending, and of its allocation between capital and O&M. Second, in the presence
of the positive productivity spillover e¤ects found here, a natural question that arises is whether
states respond to increased capital and O&M spending in neighboring states by decreasing their
own outlays (budget spillovers) or engage in expenditure competition to attract new economic
activity (see e.g. Taylor, 1992). We leave these topics for future research.
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A Data Appendix
Capital and O&M spending on public infrastructure: To construct capital spending data on water
and transportation infrastructure at the state level, we used the following series from the Rex-Dac
database: Air Trans-Cap Outlayfrom Table Rex 2 for aviation, Total Highways-Cap Outfrom
Table Rex 3 for highways and roads, Sewerage-Cap Outlayand Water Util-Cap Outlay from
Table Rex 5 for water supply and wastewater treatment, Water Trans-Cap Outlay from Table
Rex 5 for water transportation, and Transit Util-Cap Outlayfrom Table Rex 5 for mass transit.
Similarly, to construct O&M spending data on water and transportation infrastructure we used
the following series: Air Trans-Current Oper (E01), Total Highways-Cur Op, Sewerage-Current
Oper (E80), Water Util-Cur Oper (E91), Water Trans-Cur Oper (E87), and Transit Util-Cur
Oper (E94). The estimates for G and M were obtained by summing the respective expenditure
amounts for the above infrastructure components. Data series were adusted to express spending in
real (or constant) dollars.
Spillovers of capital and O&M spending on public infrastructure: the data on the value of goods
shipped from state of origin to state of destination, used for constructing the relevant weights, come
from the 1993 and 1997 Commodity Flows Surveys, U.S. Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
Output: Real GDP by state for the private non-farm sector comes from the BEA. The series
was discontinued in 1997 due to the industry classication system change from SIC (Standard
Industrial Classication) to NAICS (North American Industry Classication System). To calculate
output growth rates, we exploited both versions of the data for 1997 to be consistent with industry
denitions.
Labor: Private non-farm employment as a measure of labor was obtained from the BEA.
Income shares of labor and capital: Labor income shares, sY L; were calculated at the U.S. state level
following the procedure proposed by Gollin (2002). First, the wage and salary income of employees
was imputed as labor income. Then the average labor income of employees was calculated and
the same average labor income was imputed to the self-employed. The sum of the measured labor
income of employees and the imputed labor income of the self-employed was used as a measure of
total labor income. Dividing total labor income by total income provided an estimate of the labor
income share at the state level. State-level data on total income, employeeswages, and the income
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of the self-employed for the private non-farm business sector are available from the BEA. Given
the share of labor, the share of capital, sY K , was then determined residually as 1  sY L.
B Appendix: Semiparametric smooth coe¢ cient model
Our estimated equation can be written more concisely as:
gTFP;it = W
0
it+X
0
it (Zit) + uit (A1)
whereWit  (1; Di; t)0 ;   (0; i; b)0 ; X 0it  ( lnGit;  lnMit;  lnSG;it,  lnSM;it) ;  (Zit) 
(G (Zit) ; M (Zit) ; SG (Zit) ; SM (Zit))
0 ; and uit is the error term that satises E (uit jWit; Xit; Zit) =
0.
For the estimation we follow a three-step process (see also Chou et al., 2004). In the rst step,
all coe¢ cients are assumed to be smoothing functions of Zit and are estimated by applying a local
least-squares method with a kernel weight function:

^(Zit)
^(Zit)

=

nP
s=1
XWsXW
0
sk

Zit   Zs
h
 1 nP
s=1
XW (gTFPs) k

Zit   Zs
h

(A2)
where XWs  (Ws; Xs)0 ; k(:) is a kernel function and h is the smoothing parameter (bandwidth).
We use a standard normal (Gaussian) kernel k(u) = e u2=2=
p
2 and choose the bandwidth via
cross validation. Unlike (A1), the estimator ^(Zit) in (A2) depends on Zit in the rst step, ignoring
the fact that  is a vector of constant coe¢ cients. Subtracting X 0it^(Zit) from both sides of (A1)
yields:
gTFPit  X 0it^(Zit) = W 0it+X 0it

(Zit)  ^(Zit)

+ uit W 0it+ "it (A3)
where "it  X 0it

(Zit)  ^(Zit)

+uit: The next stage is to run a least-squares regression of (A3):
^ =

nP
it=1
WitW
0
it
 1 nP
it=1
Wit

gTFPit  X 0it^(Zit)

(A4)
The nal step is to use the second-stage linear part estimates, ^, to redene the dependent variable
in (A1), and return to the simple smooth-coe¢ cient environment of Li et al. (2002). Subtracting
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W 0it^ from both sides of (A1), we get:
gTFPit  W 0it^ = W 0it (  ^) +X 0it(Zit) + uit  X 0it(Zit) + it (A5)
where it W 0it (  ^)+uit. The smooth-coe¢ cient functions can then be estimated, as proposed
by Li et al. (2002), using a local least-squares method similar to the rst step:
^(Zit) =

nP
s=1
XsX
0
sk

Zit   Zs
h
 1 nP
s=1
Xs
 
gTFPs  W 0s^

k

Zit   Zs
h

(A6)
For details on the consistency and asymptotic normality of ^(Zit), see also Li and Racine (2007).
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Table 1. Parameter estimates of the linear model
Independent variable without spillovers with spillovers
year trend 0.0005 0.0007
(0.0001) (0.0001)
growth of capital spending ( lnG) 0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.005)
growth of O&M spending ( lnM) 0.008 -0.016
(0.009) (0.011)
growth of capital spillover ( lnSG) - 0.052
(0.012)
growth of O&M spillover ( lnSM ) - 0.411
(0.035)
R2 0.047 0.436
No. of observations 1104 1104
Notes: Estimation method is OLS and standard errors are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is TFP
growth and regressions include a constant, a time trend and state dummies.
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Table 2. Average output elasticities by state, 1978-2000 (semiparametric estimates)
State G(Zit) M (Zit) SG(Zit) SM (Zit) State G(Zit) M (Zit) SG(Zit) SM (Zit)
NORTHEAST Virginia 0.0010 -0.012 0.037 0.376
(VA) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Maine 0.0009 -0.007 0.046 0.409 West Virginia -0.0029 -0.014 0.046 0.385
(ME) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.009) (WV) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
New Hampshire -0.0008 -0.017 0.059 0.427 North Carolina -0.0012 -0.017 0.040 0.378
(NH) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.012) (NC) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Vermont -0.0003 -0.015 0.058 0.438 South Carolina -0.0006 -0.016 0.039 0.380
(VT) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.012) (SC) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Massachusetts -0.0007 -0.016 0.040 0.376 Georgia -0.0101 -0.025 0.061 0.392
(MA) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (GA) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
Rhode Island -0.0017 -0.016 0.042 0.382 Florida -0.0042 -0.019 0.047 0.383
(RI) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (FL) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Connecticut -0.0007 -0.015 0.040 0.377 Kentucky -0.0082 -0.026 0.055 0.389
(CT) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (KY) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004)
New York 0.0031 0.0004 0.037 0.388 Tennessee -0.0062 -0.028 0.048 0.385
(NY) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (TN) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Pennsylvania -0.0021 -0.010 0.059 0.438 Mississippi -0.0001 -0.020 0.035 0.372
(PA) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (MS) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
New Jersey 0.0026 -0.005 0.035 0.379 Alabama 0.0021 -0.013 0.034 0.371
(NJ) (0.0004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (AL) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Oklahoma -0.0004 -0.021 0.036 0.374
MIDWEST (OK) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Texas -0.0044 -0.020 0.047 0.381
Wisconsin 0.0027 -0.005 0.035 0.380 (TX) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
(WI) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) Arkansas 0.0023 -0.008 0.035 0.379
Michigan -0.0037 -0.025 0.074 0.461 (AR) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
(MI) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005) (0.010) Louisiana -0.0044 -0.022 0.046 0.382
Illinois 0.0025 -0.002 0.038 0.388 (LA) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)
(IL) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004)
Indiana 0.0034 -0.006 0.033 0.374 WEST
(IN) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Ohio 0.0031 -0.008 0.033 0.372 Idaho -0.0068 -0.020 0.054 0.386
(OH) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (ID) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
North Dakota -0.0038 -0.021 0.045 0.382 Montana -0.0071 -0.026 0.052 0.385
(ND) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (MT) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
South Dakota -0.0026 -0.023 0.040 0.377 Wyoming -0.0220 -0.022 0.096 0.414
(SD) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (WY) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006)
Nebraska -0.0055 -0.027 0.046 0.384 Nevada -0.0113 -0.023 0.065 0.393
(NE) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (NV) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.003)
Kansas 0.0006 -0.017 0.035 0.373 Utah -0.0060 -0.025 0.049 0.383
(KS) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (UT) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002)
Minnesota -0.0016 -0.023 0.037 0.375 Colorado -0.0007 -0.017 0.039 0.375
(MN) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (CO) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Iowa -0.0011 -0.023 0.036 0.373 Arizona -0.0111 -0.020 0.067 0.391
(IA) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (AZ) (0.002) (0.001) (0.006) (0.004)
Missouri 0.0017 -0.015 0.033 0.370 New Mexico -0.0070 -0.020 0.062 0.411
(MO) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (NM) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008)
Washington -0.0016 -0.021 0.039 0.375
SOUTH (WA) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Oregon 0.0023 -0.012 0.033 0.371
Delaware -0.0032 -0.016 0.046 0.382 (OR) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
(DE) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) California -0.0004 -0.002 0.047 0.417
Maryland -0.0037 -0.016 0.047 0.393 (CA) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
(MD) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Notes: Estimation method is partially linear semiparametric smooth coe¢ cient approach. See also Table 1.
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the estimated coe¢ cients, LGMM with demeaned data
Independent variable Mean Std Dev Variance Minimum Maximum
lagged TFP growth -0.0133 0.1259 0.0159 -0.3171 0.1981
(gTFPit 1)
growth of capital spending -0.0008 0.0136 0.0002 -0.0254 0.0197
( lnG)
growth of O&M spending 0.0095 0.0448 0.0020 -0.1227 0.0857
( lnM)
growth of capital spillover 0.0871 0.0812 0.0066 -0.1066 0.2988
( lnSG)
growth of O&M spillover 0.3371 0.2048 0.0420 0.1210 0.8467
( lnSM )
No. of observations 1008
Notes: The dependent variable is TFP growth. Details on the instruments are provided in Section 2.
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Table 4. Baseline results and sensitivity analysis
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Nonlinear part: Average Coe¢ cients
growth of capital spending -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.008 -0.007
( lnG) (0.00021) (0.00021) (0.00027) (0.00021) (0.00032)
growth of O&M spending -0.017 -0.021 -0.019 -0.029 -0.016
( lnM) (0.00038) (0.00047) (0.00050) (0.00056) (0.00032)
growth of capital spillover 0.046 0.050 0.056 0.083 0.049
( lnSG) (0.00059) (0.00060) (0.00099) (0.00051) (0.00083)
growth of O&M spillover 0.388 0.375 0.361 0.354 0.291
( lnSM ) (0.00085) (0.00074) (0.00154) (0.00121) (0.00099)
Linear part
year trend 0.0007 0.0012 0.0006 0.0003 0.0003
(0.00008) (0.0002) (0.00008) (0.00008) (0.00009)
unemployment rate - -0.001 - - -
(0.039)
federal employees - 0.651 - - -
(0.201)
state and local employees - -1.240 - - -
(0.260)
federal revenue - 0.372 - - -
(0.139)
tax burden - -0.051 - - -
(0.085)
working population - 0.267 - - -
(0.084)
non-white - 0.026 - - -
(0.031)
female - -0.006 - - -
(0.331)
No. of observations 1104 1056 1104 1104 1104
Notes: The table presents coe¢ cients obtained from the estimation of eq. (6). Column (1) reports the baseline
results. In column (2) a number of variables are employed as additional controls. In column (3) a second state variable
is used, namely the O&M share in the sum of the two spillover indices. In column (4) the spillover variables included
in the regression have been computed by weighting di¤erent states only with information on relative economic activity.
In column (5) the regression is run for highways and roads. The dependent variable is TFP growth. All regressions
include a constant and state dummies. Standard errors are reported in parenthesis.
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Table A1. Data averages by state (%, 1978-2000)
State Growth rate of Level of
Total Factor own-state spending spillovers output share O&M share in
Productivity Capital O&M Capital O&M of labor total spending
(TFP ) (G) (M) (SG) (SM ) (sY L)

M
G+M

Alabama (AL) 0.75 1.25 2.20 1.38 2.44 63.67 52.65
Arizona (AZ) 0.98 4.34 5.71 4.94 5.68 66.05 41.76
Arkansas (AR) 0.69 0.56 2.22 1.73 2.78 64.32 55.00
California (CA) 1.17 4.01 4.39 2.94 3.73 68.95 61.82
Colorado (CO) 0.93 2.10 4.37 3.78 4.70 72.92 50.09
Connecticut (CT) 1.79 3.02 1.94 2.94 3.09 68.68 50.49
Delaware (DE) 1.42 2.49 2.78 3.01 3.78 73.65 48.70
Florida (FL) 1.04 3.10 5.44 3.69 4.54 59.73 47.22
Georgia (GA) 1.33 2.84 3.19 3.65 4.80 69.79 41.99
Idaho (ID) 0.96 0.65 3.45 2.55 3.32 64.48 44.58
Illinois (IL) 0.88 -0.08 2.49 1.32 2.11 69.09 57.57
Indiana (IN) 0.65 1.11 2.63 1.14 2.26 69.67 54.78
Iowa (IA) 0.68 1.31 0.95 0.55 1.62 63.47 49.61
Kansas (KS) 0.51 1.10 3.53 1.45 2.37 64.25 51.48
Kentucky (KY) 0.26 1.60 2.77 0.74 1.83 64.98 44.42
Louisiana (LA) 0.45 -0.35 1.82 0.51 1.62 63.57 47.00
Maine (ME) 0.89 -0.50 1.69 1.89 2.18 66.57 60.07
Maryland (MD) 0.89 -0.58 3.46 1.95 3.21 58.44 51.07
Massachusetts (MA) 1.71 5.30 1.54 2.45 3.35 72.44 50.06
Michigan (MI) 0.16 0.77 2.57 0.70 1.60 71.02 65.15
Minnesota (MN) 0.97 1.93 2.05 2.44 3.10 71.49 49.04
Mississippi (MS) 0.79 0.58 1.94 1.05 2.17 58.83 50.40
Missouri (MO) 0.73 1.50 2.90 1.22 2.45 69.89 51.92
Montana (MT) 0.005 -1.15 1.43 0.48 1.11 60.97 44.34
Nebraska (NE) 0.80 0.73 1.29 1.51 2.41 65.37 45.63
Nevada (NV) 0.75 7.21 6.39 5.48 6.31 72.65 41.06
New Hampshire (NH) 1.53 -1.52 2.35 4.22 4.14 64.84 61.30
New Jersey (NJ) 1.22 2.26 3.71 2.47 2.82 64.62 55.77
New Mexico (NM) 0.83 2.80 5.20 2.28 3.23 61.61 50.51
New York (NY) 1.20 2.89 1.49 1.63 2.57 68.01 58.22
North Carolina (NC) 1.24 2.33 5.16 2.97 3.83 68.57 50.07
North Dakota (ND) 0.24 -0.19 1.09 0.55 0.85 61.13 48.11
Ohio (OH) 0.61 1.82 2.09 0.74 1.85 69.78 54.09
Oklahoma (OK) 0.15 2.52 2.24 0.87 2.00 64.46 50.18
Oregon (OR) 0.80 2.46 2.13 2.17 3.04 68.10 53.01
Pennsylvania (PA) 0.96 0.96 1.99 0.97 1.82 66.38 63.64
Rhode Island (RI) 1.56 1.27 2.30 2.54 2.04 64.25 50.27
South Carolina (SC) 1.11 5.27 4.13 2.26 3.51 64.84 51.14
South Dakota (SD) 1.08 2.47 1.00 2.15 2.78 58.29 48.14
Tennessee (TN) 0.90 2.37 2.05 2.25 3.43 69.67 45.02
Texas (TX) 0.52 3.09 3.99 2.68 3.77 70.92 46.78
Utah (UT) 0.61 3.87 5.18 3.35 4.36 69.99 45.44
Vermont (VT) 1.13 -0.46 3.41 2.83 2.88 68.51 64.08
Virginia (VA) 1.28 0.73 4.10 2.92 4.04 62.80 52.11
Washington (WA) 0.95 2.82 3.29 3.12 3.97 67.65 49.05
West Virginia (WV) 0.34 -0.19 0.94 -0.85 0.25 61.88 49.96
Wisconsin (WI) 0.55 3.04 1.49 1.28 2.37 67.12 55.77
Wyoming (WY) 0.17 1.94 2.62 0.12 1.18 63.65 35.66
Mean 0.86 1.82 2.86 2.06 2.90 66.29 50.96
Std. Dev. 0.41 1.76 1.37 1.28 1.22 4.00 6.25
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Table A2: Average output elasticities by state in the absence of spillovers, 1978-2000
State G(Zit) M (Zit) State G(Zit) M (Zit)
NORTHEAST Virginia 0.0078 0.0144
(VA) (0.0012) (0.0022)
Maine 0.0106 0.0144 West Virginia 0.0046 0.0107
(ME) (0.0006) (0.0055) (WV) (0.0014) (0.0025)
New Hampshire 0.0098 0.0006 North Carolina 0.0057 0.0102
(NH) (0.0006) (0.0066) (NC) (0.0012) (0.0022)
Vermont 0.0119 -0.0012 South Carolina 0.0063 0.0118
(VT) (0.0009) (0.0083) (SC) (0.0012) (0.0022)
Massachusetts 0.0057 0.0104 Georgia -0.0015 0.0002
(MA) (0.0014) (0.0019) (GA) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Rhode Island 0.0055 0.0108 Florida 0.0022 0.0068
(RI) (0.0013) (0.0022) (FL) (0.0014) (0.0022)
Connecticut 0.0063 0.0111 Kentucky 0.0029 0.0027
(CT) (0.0013) (0.0023) (KY) (0.0012) (0.0009)
New York 0.0114 0.0253 Tennessee -0.0001 0.0013
(NY) (0.0003) (0.0008) (TN) (0.0008) (0.0003)
Pennsylvania 0.0088 0.0131 Mississippi 0.0066 0.0082
(PA) (0.0004) (0.0047) (MS) (0.0008) (0.0013)
New Jersey 0.0103 0.0204 Alabama 0.0090 0.0142
(NJ) (0.0004) (0.0019) (AL) (0.0008) (0.0018)
Oklahoma 0.0064 0.0080
MIDWEST (OK) (0.0008) (0.0015)
Texas 0.0034 0.0054
Wisconsin 0.0104 0.0210 (TX) (0.0012) (0.0016)
(WI) (0.0006) (0.0019) Arkansas 0.0098 0.0187
Michigan 0.0086 -0.0092 (AR) (0.0006) (0.0019)
(MI) (0.0006) (0.0063) Louisiana 0.0035 0.0055
Illinois 0.0107 0.0233 (LA) (0.0012) (0.0016)
(IL) (0.0005) (0.0015)
Indiana 0.0106 0.0198 WEST
(IN) (0.0006) (0.0016)
Ohio 0.0102 0.0177 Idaho -0.0004 0.0032
(OH) (0.0006) (0.0018) (ID) (0.0013) (0.0019)
North Dakota 0.0037 0.0059 Montana -0.00002 0.0009
(ND) (0.0011) (0.0018) (MT) (0.0009) (0.0007)
South Dakota 0.0043 0.0049 Wyoming 0.0042 -0.0020
(SD) (0.0009) (0.0010) (WY) (0.0024) (0.0006)
Nebraska 0.0006 0.0025 Nevada -0.0021 -0.0008
(NE) (0.0009) (0.0008) (NV) (0.0011) (0.0006)
Kansas 0.0075 0.0109 Utah 0.0015 0.0020
(KS) (0.0008) (0.0018) (UT) (0.0010) (0.0009)
Minnesota 0.0050 0.0060 Colorado 0.0060 0.0097
(MN) (0.0008) (0.0010) (CO) (0.0012) (0.0019)
Iowa 0.0059 0.0060 Arizona 0.0015 0.0010
(IA) (0.0006) (0.0010) (AZ) (0.0013 (0.0013)
Missouri 0.0085 0.0119 New Mexico 0.0014 0.0023
(MO) (0.0007) (0.0014) (NM) (0.0014) (0.0027)
Washington 0.0052 0.0067
SOUTH (WA) (0.0010) (0.0013)
Oregon 0.0092 0.0145
Delaware 0.0044 0.0093 (OR) (0.0006) (0.0016)
(DE) (0.0014) (0.0023) California 0.0096 0.0245
Maryland 0.0044 0.0107 (CA) (0.0003) (0.0011)
(MD) (0.0012) (0.0027)
Notes: See Table 2 of the paper.
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